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It is well known by now that government spending has typically been procyclical in emerging economies
but acyclical or countercyclical in industrial countries. Little, if any, is known, however, about the
cyclical behavior of tax rates (as opposed to tax revenues, which are endogenous to the business cycle
and hence cannot shed light on the cyclicality of tax policy). We build a novel dataset on tax rates
for 62 countries for the period 1960-2009 that comprises corporate income, personal income, and value-added
tax rates. We find that, by and large, tax policy is acyclical in industrial countries but procyclical in
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There is by now a strong consensus in the literature that ￿scal policy, or more precisely government
spending, has been typically procyclical in developing countries and countercyclical or acyclical in
industrial economies.1 Figure 1, which updates evidence presented in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and VØgh
(2004), illustrates this phenomenon by plotting the correlation between the cyclical components of
output and government spending for 94 countries during the period 1960-2009. Yellow bars depict
developing countries and black bars denote industrial countries. The visual impression is striking:
while a majority of black bars lie to the left of the ￿gure (indicating countercyclical government
spending in industrial countries), the majority of yellow bars lies to the right (indicating procyclical
government spending in developing countries). In fact, the average correlation is -0.17 for industrial
countries and 0.35 for developing countries.
Several hypothesis have been put forth in the literature to explain the procyclical behavior of gov-
ernment spending in developing countries, ranging from limited access to international credit markets
to political distortions that tend to encourage public spending during boom periods. While, as argued
by Frankel, VØgh, and Vuletin (2011), some emerging economies seem to have been able to graduate
from procyclical ￿scal policy over the last decade or so, ￿scal procyclicality remains a pervasive phe-
nomenon in the developing world and reinforces ￿instead of mitigating ￿the underlying business cycle
volatility.
The other pillar of ￿scal policy is, of course, taxation. Hence, one would like to analyze the cyclical
behavior of tax rates, which are the policy instrument (as opposed to tax revenues, which are a policy
outcome).2 Unfortunately ￿and leaving aside a few studies focusing on individual countries such as
Barro (1990), Huang and Lin (1993), and Strazicich (1997) for the United States and Maihos and Sosa
(2000) for Uruguay ￿there is no systematic international evidence regarding the cyclicality of tax rate
policy. The main reason is, of course, the absence of readily-available cross-country data on tax rates.
To get around this limitation, the literature has relied on the use of (i) the in￿ ation tax (Talvi and
VØgh, 2005; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and VØgh, 2004) or (ii) tax revenues, either in absolute terms or as
a proportion of GDP (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Braun, 2001; Sturzenegger and Wernek, 2006). Both
approaches, however, have severe limitations.
The problem with the ￿rst approach is that there is simply no consensus on whether the in￿ ation
1See, for example, Ilzetzki and VØgh (2008) and the references therein.
2A note on terminology is important at this point. We will de￿ne procyclical (countercyclical) tax rate policy when
tax rates are negatively (positively) correlated with the business cycle; that is tax rates tend to fall (increase) in booms
and increase (fall) in recessions. An acyclical tax rate policy captures the case of zero correlation (i.e., no systematic
relation between tax rate and the business cycle).
2tax should be thought of as ￿just another tax.￿While there is, of course, a theoretical basis for doing
so that dates back to Phelps (1973) and has been greatly re￿ned ever since (see, for example, Chari
and Kehoe (1999)), there is little, if any, empirical support (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Poterba and
Rotemberg, 1990; Edwards and Tabellini, 1991; Roubini, 1991). Indeed, Delhy Nolivos and Vuletin
(2011) show that the in￿ ation tax can be thought of as ￿just another tax￿only when central bank
independence is low in which case the ￿scal authority e⁄ectively controls monetary policy and uses
in￿ ation according to revenue needs. When central bank independence is high, however, in￿ ation is
set by the central bank and is essentially divorced from ￿scal considerations. For whatever is worth,
Figure 2 suggests and Table 1, columns 1 and 2 con￿rm that the in￿ ation tax is countercyclical in
most industrial countries while it is, on average, acyclical in developing countries. Hence, if anything,
one would conclude that tax rate policy in developing countries is not procylical which, as will become
clear below, would be the incorrect conclusion to draw.
On the other hand ￿and as argued by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and VØgh (2004) ￿the second approach
is fundamentally ￿ awed because tax revenues constitute a policy outcome (as opposed to a policy
instrument) that endogenously responds to the business cycle. Indeed, tax revenues almost always
increase during booms and fall in recessions as the tax base (be it income or consumption) moves
positively with the business cycle. Therefore, if tax revenues are positively related to the business
cycle, there is little that we can infer regarding tax rate policy since positively related tax revenues
are consistent with higher, unchanged, and even lower tax rates during good times. It is only when
tax revenues are negatively related to the business cycle that we can conclude that tax rate policy
is procyclical. Since, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 1, columns 3 and 4, tax revenues tend to be
positively related to the business cycle, there is little that we can infer regarding the cyclicality of tax
rates.
In an attempt to correct for the endogenous ￿ uctuations in the tax base, some authors have used
revenues as a ratio of GDP, referring to it as an ￿average tax burden.￿ As discussed in Kaminsky,
Reinhart, and VØgh (2004), however, nothing can be inferred from such an indicator regarding the
cyclical properties of the policy instrument (i.e., the tax rate). For these reasons, this ￿scal indicator
is completely uninformative regarding tax policy cyclicality. To show the practical relevance of this
point, Figure 4 and Table 1, columns 5 and 6 show the correlation between the cyclical components
of government revenue to GDP ratio and real GDP. Based on this, one would (erroneously!) conclude
that tax policy is acyclical in industrial economies and countercyclical in developing countries. As we
will show in this paper, tax policy is actually procyclical in most developing countries.
3In sum, there is really no good substitute for having data on tax rates when it comes to evaluating
the cyclical properties of tax policy. This is precisely the purpose of this paper. To our knowledge,
this is the ￿rst paper to systematically study the cyclical properties of tax policy based on the use of
the policy instrument (tax rate) as opposed to outcome (tax revenues). To this end, we build a novel
annual dataset that comprises value-added, corporate, and personal income tax rates for 62 countries,
20 industrial and 42 developing, for the period 1960-2009. Using these tax rates, we compute the
degree of cyclicality of each tax and of a tax index. From an identi￿cation point of view, we also
control for endogeneity concerns using instrumental variables.3
We can summarize our main empirical ￿ndings as follows:
1. Tax policy is more volatile in developing countries than in industrial countries in the sense that
developing countries change their tax rates by larger amounts than industrial economies. This
is particularly the case for personal income and value-added taxes.
2. Tax policy is mostly acyclical in industrial countries, with the corporate income tax policy being
weakly countercyclical. On the other hand, developing economies pursue procyclical tax policies.
Why would the cyclical properties of ￿scal policy di⁄er across industrial and developing countries?
One compelling explanation is the presence of imperfections in international credit markets (Gavin
and Perotti, 1997; Riascos and VØgh, 2003). To illustrate this idea, we present the simplest possible
model of optimal ￿scal policy under incomplete markets. We show that government consumption
is procyclical regardless of preferences. Intuitively, government consumption acts much like private
consumption and is higher (lower) in the good (bad) state of nature. Interestingly enough, however,
the cyclical properties of tax policy depend on preferences. Under the most realistic parameterization
in which the ratio of government spending to private consumption (which is the tax base) is higher
(lower) in the bad (good) state of nature, tax rate policy is procyclical. Intuitively, if government
spending is high relative to the tax base in bad times, the tax rate will need to be also high in order
to satisfy the budget constraint. In good times, government spending will be low relative to the tax
base, which calls for a lower tax rate. Further, the degree of procyclicality varies directly with output
volatility. We show that this prediction of the model is consistent with the data.
The paper proceeds as follows. As background, Section 2 brie￿ y characterizes the tax revenue
structure ￿both in terms of size and composition ￿of countries around the world. Section 3 presents
the tax rate data used in the study. It also shows some basic statistics relevant for our study of
3See Rigobon (2004) and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) who challenge the idea that ￿scal policy is proclical in
developing countries based on endogeneity problems. Ilzetzki and VØgh (2008), however, argue that even after addressing
endogeneity concerns, there is causality running from the business cycle to government spending.
4cyclicality of taxation; namely the frequency and magnitude of changes in tax rates. Section 4 presents
a preliminary analysis of cyclicality of tax policy using average tax rate changes in good and bad times,
cross-country correlation plots, and basic panel regression analysis. Section 5 addresses endogeneity
issues. Section 6 develops our theoretical model of optimal ￿scal policy under incomplete markets.
Final thoughts are presented in Section 7.
2 Tax revenue structure
The tax burden, de￿ned as government revenue expressed as percentage of GDP, varies signi￿catively
across countries, ranging from 42.1 percent for Norway to 7.3 percent for the Democratic Republic
of Congo.4 The average tax burden in industrial countries is 25.5 percent of GDP, compared to 18.8
percent for developing countries (Table 2, panel A).
The relative importance of income ￿both corporate and personal ￿and value-added taxes varies
signi￿catively across countries and groups of countries. Generally speaking, industrial countries rely
heavily on direct taxation, particularly on personal income taxation. In contrast, developing economies
rely more on indirect taxation, particularly the value-added tax (Table 2, panel B).5
Compared to corporate and personal income taxation, value-added taxation is fairly modern. The
￿rst value-added tax dates back to France in 1948. Beginning in the late 1960s, the value-added tax
spread rapidly (Figure 5). Denmark was the ￿rst European country to introduce a value-added tax
in 1967. Brazil also introduced it in 1967, and it quickly spread in South America. The widespread
adoption observed since the early 1990s is mainly explained by developing countries, particularly in
Africa, Asia, and transition economies.6
3 Tax rate data
Part of this paper￿ s contribution is the creation of a novel tax rate database. Our annual data consist of
corporate and personal income tax rates as well as value-added tax rates for 62 countries ￿20 industrial
and 42 developing ￿for the period 1960-2009.7;8 For corporate and personal income data we use top
marginal tax rates. Most of the corporate and personal income tax data was obtained from the World
4See Appendix 4, Table 1A, column 1 for corresponding country statistics.
5See Appendix 4, Table 1A, columns 2-6 for individual country statistics.
6Appendix 3 reports the year in which the value-added tax was introduced in each country included in our study.
7See Appendix 2 for the list of countries.
8We excluded from our analysis major oil-producer countries such as Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Ecuador,
Gabon, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen.
For this group of countries oil revenues typically represent more than 60 percent of ￿scal revenues. These revenues are
raised in di⁄erent ways; directly via state own enterprises and indirectly trough various speci￿c taxes and royalties.
5Development Indicators (WDI-World Bank) and World Tax Database (University of Michigan, Ross
School of Business). Our data comprise, on average, about 30 and 40 years of personal and corporate
income tax rate data, respectively.9 Value-added data consist of a single standard rate.10 Value-added
data were obtained from various sources, including countries￿revenue agencies, countries￿national
libraries, books, newspapers, tax law experts, as well as research and policy papers. We should note
that for 55 out of the 62 countries included in the sample, we were able to gather the complete time
series of the value-added tax rate (i.e., since its introduction).11 We later use all of these tax rates to
calculate an index of cyclicality of tax policy.
Needless to say, while fairly comprehensive, our dataset does not come free of limitations. First, it
does not include all available tax rates such as social security, trade, property, alcohol, and tobacco,
among others. Having said that, we should note that value-added and corporate and personal income
taxes represent around 65 percent of total tax revenues in developing countries and almost 80 percent in
industrial countries. Second, personal and corporate income taxes have several brackets and marginal
rates associated with them. They also carry an intricate system of deductions and exemptions that
complicate the calculation of average marginal tax rates. While some average marginal tax rates are
available for some countries, they have been typically calculated for very short periods of time making
them unsuitable for our kind of study.12
The ￿ve most important features of the tax rate data regarding cyclicality issues are as follows:
1. About two thirds of personal and corporate income tax rates changes are negative, both in
industrial and developing countries. The opposite occurs with value-added rates; about two thirds
of such changes are positive (Table 3). These patterns re￿ ect a slow and moderate downward
trend of personal and corporate income tax rates and an upward trend of value-added tax rates.
Individual tax rates fell from about 50 percent in the early 1980s to 30 percent in the late 2000s.
Similarly, corporate tax rates decreased from about 40 percent in the early 1980s to 25 percent in
the late 2000s. On the other hand, value-added tax rates moderately increased from 15 percent
in the early 1980s to about 17 percent in the late 2000s.
2. In spite of the above-mentioned di⁄erences in long-run trends across personal, corporate and
value-added rates, tax rates changes are moderately synchronized in the short-run. In other
words, they tend to comove together in the short-run in spite of showing, generally speaking,
9Appendix 3 describes the period of coverage for each tax in each country.
10We should note that while countries usually have a reduced value-added rate, it typically applies to particular goods
such as some foodstu⁄s and child and elderly care.
11Appendix 3 describes each country year of introduction of value-added tax rate as well as its period of coverage.
12Appendix 5 show some evidence regarding the cyclicality of average marginal personal and corporate income tax
rates for six industrial economies for the period 1981-2008.
6di⁄erent long-run patterns. Table 4 shows that we cannot reject that tax rates changes are
positively correlated across di⁄erent taxes.
3. A key di⁄erence between government spending and tax rates is that the latter rarely vary every
year. While government spending occurs more or less continuously throughout the budget cycle,
changes in tax rates do not occur every year presumably because they typically require explicit
approval from congress/parliament. Indeed, the overall sample frequency of tax rate changes are
0.19, 0.18, and 0.10 for personal, corporate, and value-added taxes, respectively. Put di⁄erently,
tax rates change, on average, about every 5 years for income taxes and every 10 years for value-
added tax.
Table 5, panel A shows that with the exception of the personal income tax, which varies more fre-
quently in industrial countries, the frequency of tax rate changes is quite similar across industrial
and developing countries.
4. Both industrial and developing countries share some common average variation in tax rates
(Table 5, panel B). For personal and corporate income taxes, tax rates change about 3 percent
annually for each group. This ￿gure is about 2 percent for value-added taxes. Naturally, the
annual average change in tax rates varies signi￿cantly across countries and taxes. For example,
Norway￿ s annual average change in personal income tax rate is about 6 percent. This is the result
of frequent changes in this tax rate, which has ￿ uctuated from values close to 70 percent during
the 1970s to about 25 percent during the 1980s, and back up again to the 40 percent range in
the early 2000s. At the other side of the spectrum, Korea has never changed its VAT tax rate
(of 10 percent) since its introduction in January 1977.13
5. The similarity across groups of countries described above hides important di⁄erences regarding
the magnitude of tax rate changes. When focusing only on tax rate changes di⁄erent from zero,
developing countries show larger magnitude of tax rate changes than industrial countries (Table
5, panel C). With the exception of corporate tax rates, the percentage change in tax rates is much
higher ￿about 50 percent ￿for developing countries than industrial economies. For example,
since its introduction in January 1, 1986 Portugal has changed its VAT rate by relatively small
amounts: from 16 to 17 (February 1, 1988), from 17 to 16 (March 24, 1992), from 16 to 17
(January 1, 1995), from 17 to 19 (June 5, 2002), from 19 to 21 (July 1, 2005), and from 21 to
20 (July 1, 2008). At the other side of the spectrum, since its introduction on January 1, 1985,
Turkey changed its VAT rate on May 15, 2001 from 10 to 18 percent; that is to say, a one time
13See Appendix 4, Table 4A, columns 1-3 for corresponding country statistics.
7increase of 80 percent.
These ￿ndings regarding taxation policy (i.e., based on tax rates) are consistent with the regular-
ities observed on the government consumption side; developing countries show more volatile ￿scal
policy than industrial economies. Indeed, annual average variation in real government spending
is about 60 percent higher in developing countries than in industrial economies included in our
sample.
4 Cyclicality of tax policy: Preliminary analysis
In this section we perform a ￿rst analysis of the cyclicality of tax policy. First we use tax rate changes.
In particular, we calculate the average percentage tax rate changes in good, normal, and bad times.
Later we focus on the cyclical component of tax rates; using both cross-country correlation plots and
panel regression analysis. In each case we analyze the behavior of each tax rate as well as that of a
tax index that weights the behavior of each tax rate by its relative importance. Speci￿cally, the tax
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i capture the country￿ s average importance of each tax as a proportion of total tax revenues.
This weighting structure aims at capturing the relative relevance of each tax in the tax system.
Table 6 shows the average tax rate change evaluated at di⁄erent stances of the business cycle. While
industrial countries reduce personal income tax rates both in good and bad times, developing economies
strongly decrease them in good times. This suggests that personal income tax policy is acyclical in
industrial countries and procyclical in developing ones. Corporate income tax rates increase in good
times in industrial countries but increase in bad times in developing economies. This suggests that
corporate income tax policy is countercyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing
ones. Value-added tax rates decrease in good times in industrial countries and increase in bad times
in developing economies. Therefore, both industrial and developing countries appear to be procyclical.
The tax index, as de￿ned in equation (1), decreases both in good and bad times in industrial countries.
On the other hand, the tax index falls in good times and increases in bad times in developing economies.
Tax policy thus appears to be acyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing countries.
8We now focus on the behavior of the cyclical components of tax rates. Figure 6 shows country corre-
lations between the cyclical components of personal income tax rate and real GDP. Industrial countries
are evenly distributed: nine countries have countercyclical tax policy (i.e., positive correlation) and
eleven countries show procyclicality (i.e., negative correlation). In sharp contrast, the number of de-
veloping economies pursuing procyclical tax policy is more than twice as many as the ones showing
countercyclical tax policy. Panel regression analysis indeed supports acyclicality in industrial countries
and weak procyclicality in developing countries (Table 7, columns 1 and 2).14
Figure 7 reports analogous results for the case of the corporate income tax. Once again, the
distribution of industrial countries is about even: eleven countries have countercyclical tax policy (i.e.,
positive correlation) and nine countries show procyclical tax policy (i.e., negative correlation). In
contrast, the number of developing countries pursuing procyclical policies is more than twice as many
as the ones showing countercyclical policy. Panel regression analysis supports these ￿ndings (Table 7,
columns 3 and 4).
Figure 8 shows country correlations between the cyclical components of value-added tax rate and
real GDP. Unlike the pattern observed in Figures 6 and 7, about half of both industrial and developing
countries show procyclical policy and less than a third show countercyclicality. Table 7, columns 5 and
6 support these ￿ndings; procyclical tax policy seems to be fairly common across the board.
Figure 9 shows country correlations between the cyclical tax index, as de￿ned in equation (1), and
real GDP. In some cases, a country￿ s tax policy cyclicality re￿ ects similar behavior of di⁄erent types
of tax rates over the business cycle. For example, personal and corporate income as well as value-
added tax rates are procyclical in Bulgaria, Mexico and Peru. Conversely, taxes are countercyclical
in Germany and Switzerland. In some other cases, the cyclicality of the tax rates varies across types
of taxes; however, the overall behavior of the tax index mainly re￿ ects that of the key taxes. For
example, on the whole Turkey shows a procyclical tax policy. While personal income and value-added
taxes are strongly procyclical, corporate income tax is countercyclical. The procyclicality of the tax
system captured by the tax index re￿ ects that while personal income and value-added taxes represent
almost two thirds of revenues, corporate tax collection correspond to less than ten percent. In a similar
vein, on the whole New Zealand exhibits a countercyclical tax policy. While personal and corporate
income are countercyclical, the value-added tax is procyclical. The procyclicality of the tax system
captured by the tax index re￿ ects that while direct taxation represent almost two thirds of revenues,
value-added tax collection corresponds to only around 20 percent.
14Throughout the paper we use the term ￿weak￿ to indicate coe¢ cients that are signi￿cant only at the 15 percent
level.
9Figure 9 shows that industrial countries are evenly distributed: nine countries have countercyclical
tax policy (i.e., positive correlation) while eleven countries show procyclical tax policy (i.e., negative
correlation). Interestingly, but not surprisingly, United Kingdom, United States, Norway, and Switzer-
land pursue the most countercyclical tax policies among the industrial countries. At the other side
of the spectrum, Spain, Italy, and Greece￿ s tax policies are procyclical with correlation levels close to
that of Mexico and Turkey. The number of developing countries pursuing procyclical policies is almost
three times as many as those showing countercyclical tax policy. Panel regression analysis supports
these ￿ndings (Table 7, columns 7 and 8).
In sum, our preliminary analysis supports the idea that tax rate policy is, broadly speaking, acyclical
in developed countries and mostly procyclical in developing countries. Of course, correlations do not
imply any particular direction of causation and it could well be that real GDP is responding to changes
in tax policy rather than the other way around. The next section addresses such endogeneity issues.
5 Cyclicality of tax policy: Endogeneity issues
The panel data regression analysis of the previous section characterized the degree of pro/counter
cyclicality of tax policy ￿both at the individual tax level and aggregate tax index ￿exploiting the
comovements between the cyclical components of tax rates and real GDP. This implicitly assumes
that there is no reverse causality; that is, causality runs from business cycle ￿ uctuations to tax policy
changes and not the other way around. While this has been the traditional approach in the literature,
more recent studies (Rigobon, 2004; Jaimovich and Panizza, 2007; Ilzetzki and VØgh, 2008) have
shown that ignoring the problem of endogeneity can potentially lead to a misleading picture. In other
words, the alleged procyclicality of tax policy identi￿ed in Section 4 could just re￿ ect the e⁄ect of tax
multipliers: when tax rates increase (decrease) output decreases (increases).
This section addresses endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variables. We use three in-
struments that have already been used in the literature. First, we use an instrument suggested by







where RGDPGRj measures real GDP growth rate in country j, ￿ij is the fraction of exports from
country i to country j, and Xi=GDPi measures country￿ s i￿ s average exports expressed as share of
10GDP.15 This index of weighted real GDP growth of trading partners attempts to capture an external
shock.16
Second, we use another external shock: changes in price of exports. This terms of trade based
variable has been commonly suggested as a driver of business cycles (Mendoza, 1995; Ilzetzki and





where PXGRi measures price of exports growth rate in country i. This variable aims to capture the
e⁄ective change of prices of exports. Lastly, we use an instrument proposed by Ilzetzki and VØgh
(2008) who suggest to use the change of real returns on U.S. Treasury bills to capture global liquidity
conditions.17
In this section we also account for concerns regarding the structure of errors assumptions in the
regression analysis. We allow errors to present arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country
correlation (i.e., clustered by country). The relaxation of the non-autocorrelation assumption is im-
portant for a study using the cyclical components of both dependent variables and regressors.
Table 8 shows the ￿rst stage regression for instrumental variables estimates for each group of
countries. For both groups of countries we can reject that instruments are weak (i.e., instruments
are good predictors of the business cycle) at standard 5 percent con￿dence. The index of weighted
real GDP growth of trading partners (ShockJP) is positive and strongly signi￿cant, indicating that
an increase in real GDP of main trade partners boosts real GDP. Changes in the price of exportable
goods (ShockPX) is positive. However, it is only statistically signi￿cant for industrial countries. This
is mostly due to multicolinearity, especially with ShockJP.18 The global interest rate is negatively
related to the business cycle in developing countries but is statistically insigni￿cant.
Table 9 shows the instrumental variables regressions for personal income, corporate income, and
value-added tax rates as well as for the tax index. Before analyzing the regression results, two issues are
15As discussed in Jaimovich and Panizza (2007, page 13) ￿a time-invariant measure of exports over GDP is used
because a time-variant measure would be a⁄ected by real exchange rate ￿uctuations, and, therefore, by domestic factors.
This is not the case for the fraction of exports going to a speci￿c country...because the variation of the exchange rate
that is due to domestic factors has an equal e⁄ect on both numerator and denominator.￿
16Ilzetzki and VØgh (2008, page 20) argue that while it is unlikely that current government spending of smaller
economies has an e⁄ect on the growth rates of their trading partners, which include mainly larger economies, this could
be the true in the case of larger economies in the sample and hence suggest that results for high-income countries should
be taken with a grain of salt. Instead, for industrial countries￿regressions, we use the lagged year trade partners real
GDP growth rates (i.e., RGDPGRj;t￿1) rather than the current ones to avoid reverse causality concerns.
17Since this instrument might be endogenous in the case of the United States, we exclude this country from the
instrumental variables analysis. As in Ilzetzki and VØgh (2008), results are virtually unchanged when the United States
is included.
18The spearman correlation coe¢ cient between ShockJP and ShockPX is 0.31 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1
percent level.
11worth noting. In all cases the over-identi￿cation tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that instruments
are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and correctly excluded from the estimation equation.
Moreover, C-statistics validate the exogeneity of each instrument. These two ￿ndings, together with
the absence of weak instruments described above, strongly support the validity and strength of our
instrumental variables estimates.
Table 9, columns 1 and 2, supports the preliminary ￿ndings from Table 7, columns 1 and 2. Personal
income taxation is acyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing economies. Table 9,
columns 3 and 4, broadly supports the preliminary ￿ndings from Table 7, columns 3 and 4: industrial
economies are more countercyclical in their corporate taxation than their developing counterparts.
Corporate income taxation is weakly countercyclical in industrial countries and acyclical in developing
economies. Findings for value-added tax rates (Table 9, columns 5 and 6) are quite di⁄erent from those
in Table 7, columns 3 and 4. While developing countries pursue procyclical value-added tax policy,
industrial countries￿procyclicality vanishes once endogeneity concerns are addressed. The latter occurs
because (i) there is a shift in the coe¢ cient distribution function to the right (from -0.26 in Table 7 to
0.15 in Table 9) and (ii) there is a widening in the coe¢ cient distribution function (from an absolute
t-statistic value of 2.6 in Table 7 to 0.9 in Table 9). The second feature is typical of IV regressions;
estimates are less e¢ cient. The ￿rst change supports the presumption regarding the relevance of reverse
causality. That is to say, an increase (decrease) in value-added tax rates decreases (increases) output
in developed countries and not the other way around. This rationale is consistent with Riera-Crichton,
VØgh, and Vuletin (2011) who ￿nd sizable tax multipliers for industrial countries. Table 9, columns 5
and 6, supports the preliminary ￿ndings from Table 7, columns 5 and 6. The tax index is acyclical in
industrial countries and procyclical in developing economies.
To sum up, after addressing endogeneity concerns, we ￿nd that tax policy is acyclical in industrial
countries. Such acyclicality is present not only at an aggregate level (i.e., tax index) but also for
personal income and value-added taxation. Corporate income taxation is weakly countercyclical. On
the other hand, procyclicality dominates the behavior of tax policy in developing countries both at the
aggregate and individual tax level, with the exception of corporate taxation.
6 Model
This section develops a simple static model of optimal ￿scal policy in the presence of uncertainty
and incomplete markets that can generate both procyclical government spending and procyclical tax
12rate policy in response to ￿ uctuations in output.19 We will show that while government spending is
procyclical regardless of preferences, the cyclicality of the tax rate depends on the cyclical behavior of
public versus private spending.
Consider a one-period small open economy perfectly integrated into goods markets. There is a
single tradable good in the world. There is uncertainty regarding the exogenous output path
yH = ￿ y + ￿;
yL = ￿ y ￿ ￿;
(4)
where ￿ y > 0, ￿ > 0, and H and L denote the high output and low output state of nature, respectively.
Output follows a binomial distribution with equal probability for each state of nature. Since E(y) = ￿ y
and V (y) = ￿2, an increase in ￿ represents a mean preserving spread.20
Preferences follow the standard expected utility approach:
U =
8
> > > <



















; ￿g 6= 1 and ￿c 6= 1;
E
i=H;L
[￿ln(ci) + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(gi)]; otherwise
(5)
where g is government spending, c represents private consumption, and 1 > ￿ > 0:
The household constraints are given by21
yi = (1 + ￿i)ci; i = L;H; (6)
where ￿ is the consumption tax.22 The household chooses fcH;cLg to maximize utility (5) subject to
the constraints (6).
The government￿ s constraints are given by
￿ici = gi; i = L;H: (7)
The government chooses fgH;gL;￿H;￿Lg to maximize utility (5) subject to constraints (7) and the
implementability conditions derived from the household￿ s problem.
19Due to space limitations we do not solve the complete markets case; see VØgh (2011). In the presence of complete
markets, there would be acyclicality both in spending and tax policies.
20Similar results would hold if the probability of each state of nature were allowed to di⁄er from 0.5. However, the
income process would need to be slightly modi￿ed for an increase in ￿ to still capture a mean preserving spread. In
particular, yH = ￿ y + (1 ￿ p)￿ and yL = ￿ y ￿ p￿, where p is the probability of the high state of nature.
21For simplicity, and with no loss of generality, we assume initial assets equal to zero.
22Similar results would hold for income taxation.
13Combining the household￿ s constraints, given by expressions (6), with the government￿ s, given by
equations (7), we obtain the economy￿ s aggregate constraints:
ci + gi = yi i = L;H: (8)
For further reference, let us de￿ne two measures of cyclicality. The ￿rst measure (￿g) captures the







A positive value of this measure, which means that gH > gL, would indicate procyclicality of govern-
ment spending. Conversely, a negative value would be consistent with countercyclicality. If gH = gL,
then ￿g = 0 implying acyclicality.







A positive value of this measure, which means that ￿H > ￿L, would indicate countercyclicality of tax
policy. Conversely, a negative value would be consistent with procyclicality. If ￿H = ￿L, then ￿￿ = 0
implying acyclicality.
Solving the Ramsey￿ s planner problem, which in this case coincides with the planner￿ s problem, we
obtain the following four propositions.23;24
Proposition 1 Government spending is procyclical.
Naturally, the absence of complete markets induces the government to spend more in good times






= lnK (yH) ￿ lnK (yL) > 0; (11)
because K0 (:) > 0 and yH > yL.
Proposition 2 Tax policy may be procyclical, countercyclical, or acyclical depending on the rela-
tionship between ￿g and ￿c. For the most realistic parameterization, where ￿c > ￿g, tax policy is
procyclical.
23For this simple model, the Ramsey￿ s planner problem coincides with the planner problem because the consump-
tion tax does not distort intertemporally (because it is a static model) and does not distort intratemporally (because
households choose only one consumption good and there is no labor/leisure choice).













￿g ? 0; (12)
From proposition 1 ￿g > 0. The ￿rst term is positive if ￿c < ￿g, zero if ￿c = ￿g, and negative if
￿c > ￿g. Hence, the tax rate is countercyclical if ￿c < ￿g, acyclical if ￿c = ￿g, and procyclical if
￿c > ￿g.
In order to understand the roles of ￿c and ￿g, it is important to recall that, taking into account












Therefore, the tax rate cyclicality is tightly linked to the optimal ratio g=c across states of nature:
￿ If g=c is constant across states of nature (i.e., gH=cH = gL=cL), then ￿H = ￿L. Since c and
g increase proportionately in the good state of nature, the higher tax base allows the Ramsey
planner to leave the tax rate unchanged (￿H = ￿L; acyclical tax rates). This case results when
￿c = ￿g. Same results are obtain when using CES preferences.25
￿ If gH=cH > gL=cL, then ￿H > ￿L. Since c increase less than proportionately than g in the good
state of nature, the lower tax base induces the Ramsey planner to increase the tax rate (￿H > ￿L;
countercyclical tax rates). This case results when ￿c < ￿g.
￿ If gH=cH < gL=cL, then ￿H < ￿L. Since c increase more than proportionately than g in the
good state of nature, the much higher tax base induces the Ramsey planner to reduce the tax
rate (￿H < ￿L; procyclical tax rates). This case results when ￿c > ￿g.
The data supports the latter case where the g=c ratio is higher is bad times than in good times.
Speci￿cally, panel regressions clustered by country as well as non-parametric statistics such as the
Spearman correlation coe¢ cient clearly suggest a negative relationship between the cyclical compo-
nents of the ratio g=c and real GDP. With all countries included, the panel regression coe¢ cient is
￿0:639 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. The Spearman correlation coe¢ cient is
￿0:294 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. For industrial economies the panel regres-
sion coe¢ cient is ￿0:972 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level (t-statistic = ￿8:39). The
Spearman correlation coe¢ cient is ￿0:405 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. For devel-
oping countries the panel regression coe¢ cient is ￿0:546 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent
25CES preferences allow the optimal ratio g=c to vary with changes in the elasticity of substition. However, these
preferences would imply that the ratio g=c does not vary across states of nature.
15level (t-statistic = ￿3:51). The Spearman correlation coe¢ cient is ￿0:217 and statistically signi￿cant
at the 1 percent level.
In other words, for the most realistic parameterization where ￿c > ￿g, tax policy is procyclical (i.e.,
￿￿ < 0). If the ratio of government spending to private consumption (the tax base) is higher (lower)
in the bad (good) state of nature, tax rate policy is procyclical. Intuitively, if government spending is
high relative to the tax base in bad times, then the tax rate will need to be high as well in order to
satisfy the government budget constraint. In good times, a low level of government spending relative
to the tax base calls for a lower tax rate.
Proposition 3 Government spending procyclicality is increasing in output volatility.
Proposition 1 shows that the absence of complete markets induces government to spend more in
good times than in bad times. Naturally, higher output volatility increases spending procyclicality.















because K (:) > 0, K0 (:) > 0.26
Proposition 4 For the most realistic parameterization, where ￿c > ￿g, tax policy procyclicality is
increasing in output volatility.














d￿ > 0 and ￿c > ￿g.















From proposition 2 we know that, under the most realistic parameterization where ￿c > ￿g, the
ratio of government spending to private consumption ￿which is the tax base ￿is higher (lower) in
the bad (good) state of nature. Therefore, tax rate policy is procyclical. Equations (15) and (16)
show that tax policy procyclicality is increasing in output volatility because the di⁄erence between the
26See Appendix 6 for derivations.
16optimal g=c ratio in good and bad states of nature increases with output volatility. In other words,
the pressure to collect (i.e., higher tax rates) is more important the larger is the economic downturn
and less important during boom periods.
Indeed, propositions 3 and 4 are supported by the data. Figures 10 and 11 show that government
spending and tax policy cyclicality are increasing in output volatility. The positive relationship between
government spending cyclicality and output volatility shown in Figure 10 has been previously identi￿ed
in the literature (Lane, 2003; Talvi and VØgh, 2005; Frankel, VØgh, and Vuletin, 2011). However, the
positive relationship between tax policy cyclicality and output volatility (Figure 11) is a novel ￿nding.
7 Conclusions
There is by now a strong consensus in the literature that government spending has been typically pro-
cyclical in developing countries and countercyclical or acyclical in industrial economies. The evidence
on the taxation side is, however, almost non-existent due to the lack of data on tax rates. To analyze
the cyclical properties of tax rate policy, we build a novel dataset on tax rates for 62 countries for the
period 1960-2009 that comprises corporate income, personal income, and value-added tax rates.
We ￿nd that, by and large, tax policy is acyclical in industrial countries but procyclical in devel-
oping countries. We show that the evidence is consistent with a model of optimal ￿scal policy under
uncertainty. In the model, government spending is always procyclical regardless of preferences. Tax
rate policy is procyclical as long as the ratio of public to private consumption is high in bad times
and low in good times (the relevant case in practice). The model also predicts that both government
spending and tax rates will be more procyclical the larger is output volatility. This prediction of the
model is consistent with the evidence.
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19Appendix 1. Definition of variables and sources 
 
1.1 Macroeconomic data 
 
Gross Domestic Product 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) and International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF) were the main data sources. 
Series NGDP (gross domestic product, current prices) for WEO and 99B for IFS-IMF. For Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates data were provided by Middle East Department at the IMF. Data 
period covers 1960-2009. 
 
Government expenditure 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) was the main data source, series GCENL (central government, total 
expenditure and net lending). Due to non availability of central government data, general government data were used 
for Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. For Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, 
Qatar, and United Arab Emirates data were provided by Middle East Department at the IMF. For Brazil data was from 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA). Data period covers 1960-2009. 
 
Private consumption 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) was the main data source, series NCP (Private consumption expenditure, 
current prices). Data period covers 1960-2009. 
 
 
Government total revenue 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) was the main data source, series GCRG (central government, total revenue and 
grants). Due to non availability of central government data, general government data were used for Ecuador, Kuwait, 
Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. For Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates 




World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) and International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF) were the main data sources. 
Series NGDP_D (gross domestic product deflator) for WEO-IMF and 99BIP for IFS-IMF. For Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates data were provided by Middle East Department at the IMF. Data 
period covers 1960-2009. 
 
 
Consumer price index 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) and International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF) were the main data sources. 
Series PCPI (consumer price index) for WEO-IMF and 64 for IFS-IMF. For Azerbaijan and Kuwait data were taken 
from Global Financial Data (GFD). Data period covers 1960-2009. 
 
Government tax structure data 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS-IMF) was the data source for Government tax structure data. Data for Australia 
were from Australian Government Budget Office. 
The variables are defined as follows: tax revenue (Central government, taxes. Series cB_BA_11 and aB_BA_11), tax 
revenue on income, profits and corporations (Central government, taxes on income, profits and corporations. Series 
cB_BA_111 and aB_BA_111), personal income tax revenue (Central government, taxes on individuals. Series 
cB_BA_1111 and aB_BA_1111), corporate income tax revenue (Central government, taxes on corporations. Series 
cB_BA_1112 and aB_BA_1112), goods and services tax revenue (Central government, taxes on goods and services. 
Series cB_BA_114 and aB_BA_114), and value added tax revenue (Central government, value added tax. Series 
cB_BA_11411 and aB_BA_11411). Data period covers 1990-2009. 
 
Exports of goods and services (as % of GDP) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) and World Development Indicators (WDI-World Bank) were the main data 
source, series BX and NGDPD (WEO-IMF) and NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS (WDI-World Bank). Data period covers 1960-
2009. 
 
Global interest rate 
Global interest rate was calculated by deflating the returns on U.S. Treasuries by the CPI inflation rate of the previous 
year. As Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), we use an adaptive-expectations measure of real interest rates. These variables were 
obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF). Data period covers 1960-2009. 
 
Real external shock (ShockJP) 
Following Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) we created an index of weighted GDP growth of trading partners. In 
particular,    





S  ,                                    
where  j RGDPGR  measures real GDP growth rate in country j,  ij  is the fraction of export from country i going to 
country j, and  i i GDP X measures country i's average exports expressed as share of GDP. 
Export weights data was from Robert Feenstra and Robert Lipsey, NBER-United Nations Trade Data, 1962-2000 
(http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/) for period 1962-1985 and from Direction of Trade Statistics database (DOTS-IMF) for 
the period 1986-2009. Data period covers 1962-2009. 
 
Real external shock (ShockPX) 






S  ,                                                           
where  i PEGR  measures price of exports growth rate in country i and  i i GDP X measures country i's average exports 
expressed as share of GDP.  
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) and International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF) were the main data sources for 
price of exports. Series TXG_D  (price deflator for exports of goods) for WEO and 74 for IFS-IMF. Data period covers 
1962-2009. 
 
     
 
 
Appendix 2. Countries in the tax rate sample 
 
TABLE 1A










Italy Costa Rica Papua New Guinea
Japan Czech Rep. Paraguay
Luxembourg Dominican Rep. Peru
New Zealand El Salvador Philippines
Norway Ethiopia Romania
Portugal Fiji Russia
Spain Georgia South Africa
Sweden Ghana Tanzania
Switzerland Honduras Thailand
United Kingdom Hungary Turkey
United States India Uruguay
Jamaica Zambia
Industrial countries (20) Developing countries (42)
 
 













Period of coverage (as % 
of maximum potential)
Argentina 1979-2009 1976-2009 1974 1974-2009 100
Australia 1960-2009 1974-2009 2000 2000-2009 100
Austria 1960-2009 1975-2009 1973 1973-2009 100
Barbados 1960-2009 1974-2009 1997 1997-2009 100
Belgium 1960-2009 1975-2009 1971 1971-2009 100
Bolivia 1979-2009 1976-2006 1973 1994-2009 41.7
Botswana 1960-2009 1974-2009 2002 2002-2009 100
Brazil 1979-2009 1974-2009
Bulgaria 1993-2009 1995-2009 1994 1994-2009 100
Canada 1960-2009 1975-2009 1991 1991-2009 100
Chile 1979-2009 1974-2009 1975 1975-2009 100
China 1980-2009 1981-2009 1994 1994-2009 100
Colombia 1979-2009 1976-2009 1989 1989-2009 100
Costa Rica 1979-2009 1974-2009 1975 1999-2009 29.4
Czech Rep. 1991-2009 1991-2009 1993 1993-2009 100
Denmark 1962-2009 1975-2009 1967 1967-2009 100
Dominican Rep. 1979-2009 1979-2007 1983 1992-2009 65.4
El Salvador 1979-2009 1974-1999 1992 1992-2009 100
Ethiopia 1995-2009 2002-2007 2003 2003-2009 100
Fiji 1960-2009 1976-2007 1992 1992-2009 100
Finland 1960-2009 1974-2009 1995 1995-2009 100
France 1960-2009 1975-2009 1948 1968-2009 67.2
Georgia 1992-2007 1992-2009 1992 1992-2009 100
Germany 1960-2009 1975-2009 1968 1968-2009 100
Ghana 1960-2009 1991-2009 1998 1998-2009 100
Greece 1961-2009 1975-2009 1987 1987-2009 100
Honduras 1979-2009 1979-2007 1976 2000-2009 27.3
Hungary 1990-2009 1990-2009 1988 1988-2009 100
India 1960-2009 1974-2009 2005 2005-2009 100
Italy 1960-2009 1975-2009 1973 1973-2009 100
Jamaica 1960-2009 1974-2009 1991 1991-2009 100
Japan 1960-2009 1972-2009 1989 1989-2009 100
Kenya 1960-2009 1974-2004 1990 2000-2009 47.4
Korea 1980-2009 1974-2009 1978 1978-2009 100
Latvia 1995-2009 1995-2009 1992 1992-2009 100
Lithuania 1993-2009 1994-2009 1994 1994-2009 100
Luxembourg 1963-2009 1974-2009 1970 1970-2009 100
Malta 1960-2009 1981-2009 1995 1995-2009 100
Mauritius 1960-2009 1988-2009 1998 1998-2009 100
Mexico 1980-2009 1974-2009 1980 1980-2009 100
Namibia 1991-2009 1991-2009 2000 2000-2009 100
New Zealand 1960-2009 1974-2009 1987 1987-2009 100
Norway 1960-2009 1974-2009 1970 1970-2009 100
Pakistan 1960-2009 1974-2009 1995 1995-2009 100
Papua New Guinea 1960-2009 1974-2009 1999 1999-2009 100
Paraguay 1979-2009 1974-2009 1991 1991-2009 100
Peru 1979-2009 1976-2009 1973 1982-2009 75
Philippines 1980-2009 1974-2009 1988 1988-2009 100















Period of coverage (as % 
of maximum potential)
Romania 1993-2009 1994-2009 1994 1994-2009 100
Russia 1990-2009 1990-2009 1992 1992-2009 100
South Africa 1960-2009 1974-2009 1992 1992-2009 100
Spain 1965-2009 1975-2009 1986 1986-2009 100
Sweden 1960-2009 1974-2009 1969 1969-2009 100
Switzerland 1960-2009 1975-2009 1995 1995-2009 100
Tanzania 1960-2009 1988-2009 1998 1998-2009 100
Thailand 1975-2009 1974-2009 1992 1992-2009 100
Turkey 1983-2009 1975-2009 1985 1985-2009 100
United Kingdom 1978-2009 1975-2009 1973 1973-2009 100
United States 1960-2009 1960-2009
Uruguay 1979-2009 1976-2009 1969 1969-2009 100
Zambia 1963-2009 1974-2004 1995 1995-2009 100
Value-added tax rate
 
 Notes: Total number of countries is 62. The value-added tax in Brazil is levied by states (for goods) and by municipalities (for services). The United 
States does not have a value-added tax. The sales tax in the United States is levied by states. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Individual country revenue and tax statistics 
 
TABLE 3A
Tax revenue structure: Country tax burden and tax revenue composition
Revenues














(as % of GDP)
(as % of total tax 
revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Argentina 15.50 21.44 6.73 14.70 61.88 44.55
Australia 23.86 72.87 44.06 22.63 27.13 15.50
Austria 23.42 46.35 36.18 8.74 45.19 27.84
Bangladesh 8.08 18.27 9.99 8.28 37.29 35.50
Barbados 37.10 36.15 17.52 16.45 45.19 32.04
Belgium 31.38 59.54 47.13 12.16 38.04 26.15
Benin 16.17 22.48 9.89 12.18 43.02 41.33
Bolivia 16.55 12.86 0.00 12.86 66.33 35.74
Botswana 33.28 57.98 7.60 44.95 6.98 6.45
Brazil 14.28 42.00 2.74 11.30 52.41 17.49
Bulgaria 35.64 23.78 11.43 11.62 73.19 47.93
Cambodia 8.24 10.83 2.51 8.32 53.55 33.85
Cameroon 15.49 27.76 12.91 14.86 31.08 .
Canada 16.82 74.80 55.00 16.93 23.40 17.89
Cape Verde 28.83 29.82 16.95 12.87 54.15 36.98
Central African Rep. 14.62 22.62 13.39 8.66 38.82 29.42
Chad 22.45 . . . . .
Chile 22.51 36.75 12.25 24.50 55.02 44.94 
TABLE 3A cont.
Tax revenue structure: Country tax burden and tax revenue composition
Revenues














(as % of GDP)
(as % of total tax 
revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
China 21.47 25.92 7.18 18.73 77.73 62.54
Colombia 9.58 40.45 2.19 38.25 49.35 43.50
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 7.30 27.63 12.05 15.17 23.50 .
Congo, Rep. of 26.42 12.84 6.57 6.27 62.70 18.15
Costa Rica 11.39 20.03 6.02 14.02 56.57 34.46
Cyprus 37.94 39.75 16.95 22.12 50.03 29.39
Czech Rep. 32.05 42.25 20.30 21.95 55.51 31.65
Côte d'Ivoire 25.00 27.32 12.86 14.46 13.80 6.97
Denmark 36.82 43.75 35.06 8.69 48.54 30.98
Dominican Rep. 12.06 22.06 5.70 10.86 53.82 28.85
Egypt 27.64 41.54 10.19 31.35 39.09 28.28
El Salvador 14.64 31.77 15.27 16.50 58.27 53.04
Estonia 32.06 27.15 17.82 9.33 72.73 50.47
Ethiopia 14.29 30.65 8.67 19.72 25.09 2.73
Fiji 25.08 33.40 16.88 13.21 45.46 38.25
Finland 25.23 37.23 25.65 11.39 59.87 35.87
France 19.49 36.42 22.15 14.27 55.61 39.95
Gambia 22.52 14.00 5.28 8.62 40.29 .
Georgia 15.21 11.55 4.97 6.58 80.52 62.76
Germany 14.11 44.45 38.63 5.17 55.55 27.59
Ghana 15.74 26.64 11.16 13.89 41.45 19.28
Greece 30.82 37.59 22.48 14.25 57.02 32.94
Guatemala 10.53 27.15 2.11 17.68 60.28 46.34
Haiti 10.26 . . . . .
Honduras 13.09 27.59 14.12 13.47 62.78 36.77
Hong Kong 15.84 . . . . .
Hungary 38.14 34.61 24.36 10.25 58.15 36.82
India 9.44 34.85 14.69 19.72 38.89 0.21
Indonesia 14.65 57.25 21.17 34.76 35.22 .
Ireland 34.68 49.48 35.62 13.81 41.11 27.41
Israel 38.87 47.18 31.87 13.43 44.14 29.95
Italy 27.66 55.55 43.24 12.29 35.83 23.45
Jamaica 23.00 40.22 15.65 17.39 39.68 33.78
Japan 11.76 67.40 41.34 26.06 22.17 10.48
Jordan 25.88 15.86 4.46 11.06 42.36 0.00
Kenya 17.94 39.59 21.29 18.33 47.78 28.56
Korea 18.81 39.97 20.46 19.51 42.51 27.31
Laos 11.90 25.39 . . 60.44 .
Latvia 26.73 25.24 9.61 15.64 73.00 49.64
Lithuania 27.70 28.23 15.33 12.90 71.17 47.31
Luxembourg 38.56 46.34 28.30 18.04 47.47 22.39
Madagascar 14.25 17.62 5.49 9.17 26.99 .
Malaysia 26.82 57.51 14.11 43.20 30.55 .
Mali 16.64 20.85 6.39 13.60 54.17 40.47
Malta 38.29 43.01 23.47 19.28 50.00 27.65
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(as % of GDP)
(as % of total tax 
revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(as % of total 
tax revenues)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mexico 13.79 43.26 14.42 28.84 73.18 27.59
Morocco 20.75 37.11 18.78 18.01 44.07 29.55
Mozambique 16.62 31.42 16.47 14.79 58.36 38.34
Myanmar 9.33 30.11 30.11 0.00 49.77 .
Namibia 31.21 39.27 23.90 15.37 21.92 21.15
Nepal 10.66 18.46 1.33 14.19 46.60 34.91
Netherlands 30.24 46.68 29.66 17.02 47.77 30.04
New Zealand 34.80 66.33 51.26 15.07 30.29 21.80
Nicaragua 21.62 27.93 . . 65.54 41.58
Niger 21.48 17.84 6.20 10.90 27.17 19.78
Norway 42.13 53.55 18.25 35.20 44.24 29.54
Pakistan 13.73 24.28 4.21 22.10 39.97 26.51
Panama 19.15 38.02 1.84 12.27 33.07 .
Papua New Guinea 23.68 54.14 26.56 26.86 12.41 12.41
Paraguay 12.70 18.52 0.00 18.52 59.06 42.94
Peru 13.68 29.91 9.57 20.34 54.40 40.74
Philippines 15.13 45.32 15.73 23.37 29.95 14.29
Poland 31.66 27.82 17.07 10.75 70.49 43.69
Portugal 20.70 40.13 26.02 14.11 55.90 33.26
Romania 25.68 28.88 5.99 22.62 66.26 40.19
Russia 29.94 10.75 0.03 10.56 60.64 49.19
Rwanda 13.87 19.49 9.40 4.81 39.04 .
Senegal 18.98 23.21 12.27 7.94 32.03 32.03
Seychelles 36.01 19.95 1.24 18.71 26.99 31.23
Sierra Leone 17.22 25.11 11.15 13.23 26.81 0.00
Singapore . 46.59 . . 32.52 12.32
South Africa 20.75 57.29 30.75 26.54 35.16 26.70
Spain 18.53 58.75 37.09 21.66 40.76 26.79
Sri Lanka 18.70 16.09 5.33 8.72 60.43 34.89
Swaziland 24.68 27.68 16.74 9.95 17.00 .
Sweden 31.65 24.44 11.47 12.97 56.48 37.39
Switzerland 9.48 33.53 22.30 11.23 59.66 38.48
Syrian Arab Rep. 23.28 33.99 . . 42.42 .
Tanzania 15.96 24.00 12.00 7.00 65.00 36.00
Thailand 16.55 45.93 12.74 33.20 46.11 22.10
Togo 23.81 22.21 6.68 11.28 50.42 40.86
Trinidad and Tobago 32.51 54.36 23.00 26.48 34.41 .
Tunisia 24.37 28.86 15.87 11.95 42.41 31.58
Turkey 15.98 44.48 34.20 9.19 46.10 29.85
Uganda 12.77 22.16 8.53 11.44 55.45 31.83
United Kingdom 33.82 49.82 37.58 12.24 40.54 22.88
United States 18.66 89.80 73.96 15.85 6.03 0.00
Uruguay 20.22 17.40 6.28 10.48 60.65 39.97
Zambia 29.51 43.46 34.17 9.29 43.96 29.71
 TABLE 4A
Tax rate data: Country characteristics
PIT CIT VAT PIT CIT VAT PIT CIT VAT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Argentina 1.75 3.40 4.87 0.13 0.13 0.26 13.14 26.36 18.92
Australia 1.00 2.11 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.00 4.99 8.84 .
Austria 0.57 2.30 0.66 0.03 0.09 0.06 19.35 24.72 11.81
Barbados 1.65 1.85 1.19 0.13 0.14 0.07 12.40 13.23 16.67
Belgium 1.05 2.39 1.03 0.15 0.17 0.16 6.81 14.36 6.55
Bolivia 4.20 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 48.33 . .
Botswana 2.58 2.25 2.50 0.16 0.10 0.13 16.02 22.52 20.00
Brazil 6.28 2.29 0.00 0.23 0.10 0.00 26.90 23.65 .
Bulgaria 8.38 9.07 2.09 0.33 0.47 0.13 25.14 19.28 15.66
Canada 1.33 3.28 1.72 0.08 0.23 0.11 17.28 14.32 15.48
Chile 1.74 7.87 0.46 0.25 0.31 0.06 6.96 25.57 7.78
China 0.00 2.31 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 . 23.07 .
Colombia 2.86 2.51 2.83 0.18 0.31 0.10 16.01 8.09 28.33
Costa Rica 3.00 1.65 6.25 0.07 0.06 0.10 45.00 25.56 62.50
Czech Rep. 5.95 4.99 1.12 0.36 0.63 0.13 16.66 7.91 8.99
Denmark 12.76 2.96 2.49 0.37 0.27 0.12 34.44 11.11 20.96
Dominican Rep. 3.30 3.55 4.90 0.14 0.23 0.12 24.22 15.72 41.67
El Salvador 2.58 1.54 1.76 0.09 0.10 0.06 28.33 15.87 30.00
Ethiopia 0.00 3.12 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 . 15.60 .
Fiji 1.48 1.30 1.47 0.15 0.16 0.06 9.62 8.14 25.00
Finland 3.52 3.40 0.00 0.44 0.24 0.00 8.05 14.15 .
France 2.40 0.79 1.73 0.30 0.18 0.17 7.88 4.37 10.11
Georgia 2.94 2.86 2.94 0.06 0.07 0.11 50.00 42.86 26.43
Germany 0.82 3.40 1.65 0.13 0.16 0.17 6.60 21.24 9.67
Ghana 3.17 3.09 2.27 0.13 0.25 0.09 25.32 12.34 25.00
Greece 2.26 3.23 1.33 0.15 0.29 0.14 14.67 11.29 9.72
Honduras 1.49 5.04 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.00 20.83 39.08 .
Hungary 3.51 6.86 0.95 0.37 0.25 0.05 9.52 27.45 20.00
India 2.79 6.58 0.00 0.15 0.34 0.00 18.13 19.35 .
Italy 1.38 4.73 1.55 0.20 0.16 0.11 6.88 29.57 13.95
Jamaica 2.39 1.93 3.06 0.07 0.12 0.17 33.51 16.05 18.33
Japan 2.67 1.30 3.33 0.14 0.22 0.05 19.75 5.91 66.67
Kenya 2.65 7.87 1.11 0.22 0.20 0.10 11.92 39.33 11.11
Korea 1.51 1.84 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.00 7.24 7.87 .
Latvia 2.61 3.11 3.92 0.14 0.20 0.12 18.29 15.56 33.33
Lithuania 5.24 3.22 0.37 0.33 0.12 0.07 15.71 27.37 5.56
Luxembourg 0.99 1.74 1.79 0.24 0.22 0.08 4.13 7.84 23.33
Malta 1.65 1.42 1.43 0.04 0.06 0.07 46.15 23.68 20.00
Mauritius 4.26 2.19 4.09 0.16 0.10 0.18 26.98 23.05 22.50
Mexico 2.99 2.08 4.60 0.30 0.40 0.10 9.97 5.21 44.44
Namibia 2.80 0.68 0.00 0.39 0.11 0.00 7.20 6.45 .
New Zealand 2.69 2.25 1.14 0.20 0.14 0.05 13.47 16.09 25.00
Norway 6.12 0.35 0.59 0.55 0.06 0.10 11.22 5.76 5.76
Pakistan 3.39 4.11 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.00 23.71 15.82 .
Papua New Guinea 3.58 2.41 0.00 0.21 0.18 0.00 16.89 13.40 .
Paraguay 9.09 2.69 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 100.00 41.67 .
Peru 3.69 2.42 9.07 0.23 0.16 0.41 16.35 15.03 22.27
Philippines 1.84 1.08 0.95 0.13 0.17 0.05 14.71 6.50 20.00
Portugal 2.15 4.88 1.98 0.15 0.30 0.26 13.99 16.51 7.57
Romania 6.41 5.05 2.39 0.20 0.18 0.13 32.04 28.59 17.93
Russia 8.89 3.30 3.95 0.26 0.25 0.29 33.79 13.18 13.41
South Africa 0.74 2.44 2.35 0.15 0.26 0.06 4.79 9.57 40.00
Spain 4.12 1.09 1.32 0.38 0.11 0.13 10.70 9.85 10.13
Sweden 7.28 2.87 2.84 0.63 0.12 0.15 11.65 23.89 18.90
Switzerland 0.90 7.32 1.19 0.14 0.07 0.14 6.27 104.92 8.36
Tanzania 5.32 9.21 0.00 0.29 0.16 0.00 18.62 57.87 .
Thailand 1.46 0.43 4.29 0.06 0.03 0.12 24.06 14.29 36.43
Turkey 3.83 4.22 3.33 0.33 0.15 0.04 11.48 28.50 80.00
United Kingdom 1.04 1.85 3.85 0.03 0.25 0.11 33.33 7.39 34.61
United States 3.53 1.25 0.00 0.31 0.18 0.00 11.54 6.92 .
Uruguay 0.00 2.18 2.49 0.03 0.13 0.15 . 16.90 16.60
Zambia 3.21 2.22 1.40 0.13 0.21 0.13 24.62 10.42 10.54
Percentual absolute 
change in tax rates. 
Including zero changes
Frequency of tax rate 
changes
Percentual absolute change in 
tax rates. Without including 
zero changes
 
Notes: PIT, CIT and VAT stand for personal income tax, corporate income tax and value-added tax respectively. 
 Appendix 5
In this section we perform analyses similar to that of Sections 4 and 5 using average marginal personal
and corporate income tax rates for six industrial economies (Australia, Belgium, France, Germany,
United Kingdom, and United States) for the period 1981-2008.27 It is worth noting that the Spearman
rank correlations between our top marginal tax rates and the average marginal ones are 0.26 and 0.54
for personal and corporate income taxes. For both taxes, such relationship is statistically signi￿cant
at the 1 percent level; supporting the use of top marginal rates as proxy for average marginal ones.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5A show analogous basic panel regressions to that of columns 1 and 3
in Table 7 using average marginal as opposed to top marginal tax rates. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 in
Table 5A show similar instrumental variables panel regressions to that of columns 1 and 3 in Table 9.
Like our ￿ndings, acyclicality in tax rates are supported even after considering potential endogeneity
concerns.
TABLE 5A









(1) (2) (3) (4)
RGDP cycle -0.51 -0.05 -1.19 -0.10
[-1.1] [-0.3] [-1.2] [-0.2]
STATISTICS
Weak-identification test (p-value) 0.016 0.001
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.57 0.22
Exogeneity of ShockPX (p-value) 0.29 0.31
Exogeneity of ShockJP (p-value) 0.88 0.12
Exogeneity of Global int. rate (p-value) 0.79 0.39
Number of observattions 147 168 135 151
Number of countries 6 6 6 6
Basic panel regressions Instrumental variables regressions
27We would like to thank Ethan Ilzetzki for sharing this dataset.
20Appendix 6
This appendix solves the Ramsey￿ s planner problem, which in this case coincides with the planner
problem, of the model from Section 6.28 The planner chooses an allocation fcH;cL;gH;gLg to maximize
the households￿utility (8) subject to the economy￿ s aggregate constraints (given by (8)). From ￿rst









i = L;H: (17)









= yi i = L;H: (18)
While we cannot obtain a reduced-form solution for gi from (18) for the general case when ￿c 6= ￿g,








, we can write (18)
as follows
k(gi) = yi; (19)









i > 0. Therefore, we can characterize gi￿ s relationship with yi as
follows
gi = K (yi); (20)






= lnK (yH) ￿ lnK (yL) > 0 (21)
because K0 (:) > 0 and yH > yL.










i = L;H: (22)












￿g ? 0 (23)
28For this simple model the Ramsey￿ s planner problem coincides with the planner problem because taxes are non-
distortive. Since output is assumed exogenous there is no distortion originated from labor-leisure decisions.
21Figure 1. Country correlations between the cyclical components 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter. Real government expenditure is defined as central government expenditure and net lending deflated by the GDP deflator. A positive (negative) 
correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. Source: Frankel, Végh and Vuletin (2011). 
 
 
Figure 2. Country correlations between the cyclical components  





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter. Inflation tax is defined as (π/(1+ π))*100, where π is inflation. Sample includes 124 countries. 
 Figure 3. Country correlations between the cyclical components  


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter. Real government revenue is defined as central government total revenue and grants deflated by the GDP deflator. Sample includes 105 countries. 
 
 
Figure 4. Country correlations between the cyclical components  


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter. Real government revenue is defined as central government total revenue and grants deflated by the GDP deflator. Sample includes 105 countries. 
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Source: Oldman and Schenk (2007) and authors' sources. 
 
 
Figure 6. Country correlations between the cyclical components  








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter. A negative (positive) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. Sample includes 62 countries. 
 
 Figure 7. Country correlations between the cyclical components  








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter. A negative (positive) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. Sample includes 62 countries. 
 
 
Figure 8. Country correlations between the cyclical components  





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
Filter. A negative (positive) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. Sample includes 60 countries. Figure 9. Country correlations between the cyclical components  








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-




Figure 10. Country relationship between the cyclicality of real  
government expenditure and real GDP volatility. 1960-2009 
Corr(G, RGDP) = 0.48*** Output volatility - 0.22

























Notes: The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real GDP volatility is calculated as the logarithm of the standard deviation of the cyclical component of real RGDP. 
Sample includes 47 countries. 
 Figure 11. Country relationship between the cyclicality of the  
tax index and real GDP volatility. 1960-2009 
  Corr(tax index, RGDP) = -0.08** Output volatility - 0.02





































Notes: The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A negative (positive) correlation indicates procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real GDP volatility is calculated as the logarithm of the standard deviation of the cyclical component of real RGDP. 






Cyclicality of tax policy: Alternative tax indicators frequently used in the literature
Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RGDP cycle 10.48*** 1.87 0.98*** 1.50*** 0.02 0.59***
[6.0] [0.3] [7.5] [16.8] [0.1] [6.2]
Number of observations 1030 3666 901 3008 901 3008
Number of countries 22 86 21 67 21 67
Inflation tax Revenues Revenues/GDP
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclical component of each tax indicator: inflation tax, revenues, and revenues/GDP. Inflation tax is defined as (π/(1+ 
π))*100, where π is inflation. Real government revenue is defined as central government total revenue and grants deflated by the GDP deflator. The regressor is 
the cyclical component of real GDP. Estimations are performed using country-fixed-effects. t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant term is not reported. 
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 TABLE 2
Tax revenue structure: Tax burden and tax revenue composition
Industrial Developing Difference ≡ (1) - (2)
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: Tax burden
Tax revenues (as % of GDP) 25.5 18.8 6.7***
PANEL B: Tax revenue composition (as % of total tax revenues)
1. Tax revenue on income, profits, and corporations  50.1 31.0 19.1***
1.1. Personal income tax revenues 35.4 12.6 22.8***
2.2. Corporate income tax revenues 14.4 16.3 -1.9***
2. Good and services tax revenues 44.2 46.5 -2.3**
2.1. Value-added tax revenues 28.8 31.6 -2.8***
3. Others 5.7 22.5 -16.8***
Notes: The mean test is a t-test on the equality of means for two groups; the null hypothesis is that both groups have the same mean.  





Direction of tax rates changes
Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax rate increases 34 21 52 72 53 42
Tax rate decreases 101 134 114 161 13 25
Total tax rate changes 135 155 166 233 66 67





























































Personal income tax 1
Corporate income tax   0.15*** 1
Value-added tax 0.07** 0.05* 1
Notes: Spearman's rank correlation coefficients are reported.  




Frequency and magnitude of tax rate changes
Industrial Developing Difference ≡ (1) - (2)
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: Frequency of tax rate changes
Personal income tax 0.23 0.16 0.07***
Corporate income tax 0.11 0.18 -0.07
Value-added tax 0.11 0.09 0.02
PANEL B: Percentual absolute change in tax rates. Including zero changes
Personal income tax 2.86 3.08 -0.22
Corporate income tax 2.65 3.23 -0.58
Value-added tax 1.57 2.18 -0.61
PANEL C: Percentual absolute change in tax rates. Without including zero changes
Personal income tax 12.24 18.23 -5.99***
Corporate income tax 14.52 17.98 -3.46
Value-added tax 14.41 22.85 -8.44***
Notes: The mean test is a t-test on the equality of means for two groups; the null hypothesis is that both groups have the same mean. 





Percentage tax rate changes across different stances of the business cycle
Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Good times -0.29 -1.19 0.74 0.09 -0.64 -0.17 -0.01 -0.25
Normal times 0.16 0.34 -0.08 -0.81 0.23 -0.28 0.12 0.04
Bad times -0.11 0.42 -0.55 1.54 0.13 0.89 -0.29 0.15
Tax index Personal income tax Corporate income tax Value-added tax
Notes: Percentage tax rate changes are reported as difference with respect to the overall (i.e., not distinguishing across stances of the business cycle) mean. Therefore, 
positive (negative) values indicate tax rate changes above (below) the mean. Good (bad) times are defined as those years for which the real GDP cycles are in the first 
higher (lower) quartile for each country. Normal times are defined as those years for which the real GDP cycles are in the second and third quartile for each country.  
 
TABLE 7
Cyclicality of tax policy: Basic panel regressions
Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RGDP cycle 0.03 -0.39˟ 0.14 -0.11** -0.26** -0.35*** -0.09 -0.24***
[0.2] [-1.6] [0.9] [-2.2] [-2.6] [-5.5] [-0.9] [-3.6]
Number of observations 639 1089 900 1323 614 764 509 662
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s2 04 2 2 04 2 2 04 2 2 04 2
Personal income tax Corporate income tax Value-added tax Tax index
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclical component of each tax indicator: personal income tax rate, corporate income tax rate, value-added tax rate, and the cycle 
of tax index. The regressor is the cyclical component of real GDP. Estimations are performed using country-fixed-effects. t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant 
term is not reported. 
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 TABLE 8







Global interest rate 0.05˟ -0.04
[1.5] [-0.5]
STATISTICS
Weak-identification test (p-value) 0.005 0.042
Number of observattions 397 451
Number of countries 17 26
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclical component of real GDP. The regressors in the 
first stage regressions (i.e., the excluded instruments) are ShockPX, ShockJP, and Global 
interest rate. Estimations are performed using two-step efficient GMM country-fixed-effects, 
allowing errors to present arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country correlation 
(i.e., clustered by country). t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant terms are not reported. 
The weak-identification test is Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic; the null hypothesis is that 
the model is weakly identified (i.e., the excluded instruments have a nonzero correlation with 
the endogenous regressors but small).  





Cyclicality of tax policy: Instrumental variables regressions
Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RGDP cycle -0.20 -11.30˟ 0.69˟ -0.88 0.15 -1.15** -0.02 -1.39**
[-0.3] [-1.6] [1.6] [-0.8] [0.9] [-2.5] [-0.1] [-2.0]
STATISTICS
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.23 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.32 0.62 0.91 0.54
Exogeneity of ShockPX (p-value) 0.39 0.25 0.47 0.38 0.14 0.81 0.75 0.27
Exogeneity of ShockJP (p-value) 0.75 0.27 0.60 0.78 0.13 0.54 0.88 0.37
Exogeneity of Global int. rate (p-value) 0.09 0.60 0.41 0.71 0.68 0.35 0.73 0.67
Number of observattions 397 451 397 451 397 451 397 451
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 1 72 6 1 72 6 1 72 6 1 72 6
Tax index Personal income tax Corporate income tax Value-added tax
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclical component of each tax indicator: personal income tax rate, corporate income tax rate, value-added tax rate, and the cycle of tax 
index. The regressor is the cyclical component of real GDP. The excluded instruments are ShockPX, ShockJP, and Global interest rate (see Table 8 for first stage regression 
estimates). Estimations are performed using two-step efficient GMM country-fixed-effects, allowing errors to present arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country 
correlation (i.e., clustered by country). t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant terms are not reported. The over-identification test is Hansen's J statistic; the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are exogenous (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). The exogeneity test of each excluded instrument is C statistic; the null hypothesis is that the excluded 
instrument tested is exogenous (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term).  
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 